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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTIAN P. JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 47113-2019
Ada County Case No.
CR01-19-6696

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.
Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to felony DUI?
2.
Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 18, 2019, a store manager contacted the police after Johnson “walked into
[the] store drunk,” then “drove off and came back multiple times, asking to fill up his tire.” (PSI,

p. 109. 1) Officers responded and located Johnson’s vehicle in an alley next to the shop, “with
the engine running and the brake lights depressed.” (PSI, p. 109.) Johnson was inside the shop
and, when officers “asked him to step outside he initially refused,” but “later ‘stumbled outside
and immediately sat down on a nearby gas meter.’” (PSI, p. 109.) Johnson acknowledged that
he had been drinking and that he left the van running in the alley, but provided a false name to
officers, and then claimed he “did not have a name or date of birth.” (PSI, p. 109.) Officers
“conducted field sobriety tests, which [Johnson] could not do.” (PSI, p. 109.) Officers learned
that Johnson had an active warrant for his arrest and, when they attempted to take him into
custody, he “stood up quickly, took a fighting stance,” and “brought both arms up as if he was
going to throw a punch. Officers moved to take him to the ground” and Johnson “actively
resisted” until he was placed in handcuffs. (PSI, p. 109.) Johnson was “placed in a WRAP and
seated in the backseat” of a patrol vehicle, where he “yelled obscenities and urinated on himself,
refusing to answer the question as to whether or not he would provide a breath or blood sample.
A warrant was secured and testing returned with a .137 BAC.” (PSI, p. 109.)
The state charged Johnson with felony DUI (two or more convictions within 10 years),
resisting and/or obstructing officers, and driving without privileges. (Aug., pp. 1-2.) Pursuant to
a plea agreement, Johnson pled guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the remaining
charges. (R., p. 18.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three
years fixed. (R., pp. 38-42.) Johnson filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of
conviction. (R., pp. 43-45.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence,
which the district court denied. (Aug., pp. 3-7, 24-26.)
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Conf.DocssJohnson.pdf.”
2

On appeal, Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to felony DUI, and by
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 2.)

ARGUMENT
I.
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Johnson contends his sentence is excessive in light of his mental health issues, substance

abuse, willingness to participate in treatment, acceptance of responsibility, and purported
remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-7.) The record supports the sentence imposed.

B.

Standard Of Review
“An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. Where a

sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a
clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Bonilla, 161 Idaho 902, 905, 392 P.3d 1243, 1246 (Ct. App.
2017). “To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive, considering any view of the facts.” State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). “A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at
the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution applicable to a given case.” State v. Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 417 P.3d 1007, 1013 (Ct.
App. 2018). The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them
differing weights when deciding upon the sentence. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 9, 368 P.3d at 629.
“In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence
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where reasonable minds might differ.” Id. at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146
Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the
limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
At sentencing, the district court stated that Johnson has a “long” and “colorful” criminal

history that “shows in many cases that you repeated the same crimes again and again. It shows
that you were not learning.” (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 18-22.) The court articulated its concern that
Johnson blamed his conduct in the instant offense on “life’s events,” since “bad things” will
continue to “happen to [him] in the future.” (Tr., p. 24, L. 25 – p. 25, L. 10.) The court also
pointed out that Johnson had “already lost [his] license, but that hasn’t stopped [him] before from
driving, even when [he] didn’t have privileges.” (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 13-16.) The court concluded
that it had “significant concerns,” noting that the “most important” goal of sentencing “is
protection of society, trying to keep people safe” and that Johnson has a history of “mak[ing]
choices that put people at risk. We’re dealing with your ninth DUI.” (Tr., p. 25, L. 20 – p. 26, L.
4.) “There are a lot of other issues here, including the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
other issues of risk.” (Tr., p. p. 26, Ls. 5-7.) Accordingly, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p. 26, L. 20 – p. 27, L. 2.)
The district court’s analysis is supported by the record.

Johnson has an extensive

criminal history that consists of at least 60 prior criminal convictions, including eight prior DUI
convictions and felony convictions for burglary, attempted robbery (amended from strong arm
robbery), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. (PSI, pp. 110-21.) As the district court
noted, Johnson’s criminal record shows that he has a history of placing others at risk, and he has
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committed certain crimes repeatedly – in addition to his numerous prior DUI convictions, he has
convictions for assault, intent to assault with a deadly weapon, battery, domestic battery,
assault/battery on certain personnel, three convictions for disturbing the peace, second degree
stalking, five separate convictions resisting/obstructing officers, inattentive/careless driving,
negligent driving, and three convictions for reckless driving. (PSI, pp. 112, 118, 120-21.) He
also has a history of violating the terms of community supervision and was on absconder status
when he committed the instant offense. (PSI, pp. 113-22.) Johnson’s probation officer reported
that Johnson “did not do well on supervision” and he “was unable to complete successfully even
with all of his support in place,” which included weekly check-ins with his probation officer, the
ACT team, and his mental health medication manager.

(PSI, p. 122.)

The presentence

investigator determined that Johnson presents a high risk to reoffend (PSI, p. 133), and the
psychological evaluator reported that Johnson “would be considered a High risk to engage in
future general violence” (PSI, p. 142). Johnson’s criminal history and risk to reoffend support
the district court’s conclusions that the protection of society was a significant concern in this
case and that a prison sentence was necessary to meet the goals of sentencing.
On appeal, Johnson argues that his sentence is excessive in light of his substance abuse
and mental health issues, willingness to participate in treatment, acceptance of responsibility, and
purported remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.) These factors do not establish that the district
court abused its discretion. Johnson has been abusing substances for well over three decades,
and he has been afforded an abundance of rehabilitative treatment and programming, yet he has
failed to rehabilitate. (PSI, pp. 107, 112, 115-16, 119, 121-22, 128, 150.) He has also been
provided with extensive mental health services, including “the ACT team” services, outpatient
treatment via the Terry Reilly Clinic and Central District Health, inpatient treatment at
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Intermountain Hospital, and medication management “through Health & Welfare.” (PSI, pp.
122, 127.)

Despite this, Johnson has continued to abuse substances, commit crimes, and

endanger the community by driving while intoxicated.
Johnson’s sentence is appropriate in light of Johnson’s ongoing disregard for the law, his
failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite numerous prior legal sanctions and the extensive
rehabilitative opportunities afforded him, and the danger he presents to the community. Johnson
has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.

II.
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His
Motion For Reconsideration Of His Sentence
A.

Introduction
Johnson next asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule

35 motion for a reduction of sentence, because he is unable to immediately begin programming,
he has support from his mother and his aunt, he submitted a probation plan, and he “wrote
numerous letters to the district court promising never to drink alcohol again.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 7-8.) Johnson has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 177, 180, 369 P.3d
955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
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district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007).

C.

Johnson Failed To Show His Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information
Johnson provided no “new” information in support of his Rule 35 motion for a reduction

of sentence. Information with respect to Johnson’s family support, his plans to participate in
treatment and be successful in the community, and his claim that he would no longer consume
alcohol was before the district court at the time of sentencing. (PSI, pp. 129-30, 134.) The
district court was likewise aware, at the time of sentencing, that Johnson wished to participate in
treatment via the retained jurisdiction program (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 13-23; p. 19, Ls. 4-5), and it is not
“new” information that prisoners are most often placed in such treatment nearer to their date of
parole eligibility. Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is an issue more
properly framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or under the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act.” State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520, 777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct.
App. 1989) (affirming district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion).
Because Johnson presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed
to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having failed to make such a
showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his
Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Johnson’s conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order denying Johnson’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 6th day of December, 2019.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of December, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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